We study an optimal contracting problem with one-sided commitment. We show that the optimal allocation in this problem is equivalent to an otherwise completemarkets allocation but for a borrowing constraint. Under full commitment, the optimal allocation of the contracting problem would be equivalent to the standard complete-markets allocation. In our model, therefore, we can pinpoint the role of the borrowing constraint as an optimal way to mitigate the limited commitment friction (i.e., the risk of default). Our model, thus, formalizes the natural but hitherto imprecise intuition that relates borrowing constraints to the risk of default.
Introduction
Individuals, …rms, and sovereigns alike face limits on the amounts they can borrow from their lenders. In this paper, we obtain a set of conditions under which such borrowing constraints emerge as a key element of an optimal contractual arrangement between a borrower and a lender.
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We study an optimal contracting problem between a risk-neutral, fully-committed, deep-pocketed principal and a risk-averse, non-committed agent whose stochastic income process is an Ito di¤usion. In this setting, we show that any e¢ cient allocation of the agent's consumption can be represented as a strictly increasing function of the maximal level of the agent's income realized to date. At any e¢ cient allocation, therefore, the agent's consumption path is weakly increasing and constant whenever current income is strictly below its all-time maximum. In many cases, we provide closed-form characterization of the e¢ cient allocations.
In addition, we provide a simple trading mechanism that implements e¢ cient allocations. This mechanism is as follows. The principal makes available to the agent a bank account, in which the agent can save or borrow from the principal at a riskless interest rate equal to the principal's and agent's common rate of time preference. The principal also gives the agent access to a hedging account, in which the agent can transfer his income risk to the principal at fair-odds pricing. The agent faces no limits on the size of the hedge he can take out in the hedging account, i.e., he can transfer 100 percent of his income risk to the principal. Importantly, however, the agent faces a borrowing limit in the riskless account. The size of the borrowing limit depends only on the agent's current level of income. In this mechanism, the agent can freely choose his trading strategy. As well, the agent can default at any point in time. We show that under these conditions, the agent's equilibrium (i.e., individually-optimal) trading strategy results with an e¢ cient allocation of consumption. As well, the agent never defaults. This trading mechanism, thus, implements e¢ cient allocations. Despite being able to fully hedge his income risk at any given point in time, in equilibrium the agent will choose a hedging strategy that less-than-fully insures his income risk, at all times. Along the equilibrium path, starting from any given point in time, the borrowing limit will bind at some point in the future with probability one.
In an environment otherwise identical to ours but in which the agent can fully commit, any e¢ cient allocation of consumption, clearly, would provide the agent with full insurance. It is a simple observation that such allocations could be implemented with a combination of a hedging account with no restrictions on hedging and a riskless bank account with no restrictions on borrowing. 1 Furthermore, it is easy to see that this trading mechanism without the borrowing constraint would not implement any e¢ cient allocation of the limited-commitment environment, as over the desired equilibrium strategy the agent would prefer to accumulate debt and default. The limited-commitment optimum, therefore, is implementable if and only if the agent faces a borrowing constraint.
In our model, thus, we are able to pinpoint the role of the borrowing constraint. Namely, this role is to e¢ ciently mitigate the default risk. This …nding is intuitive and this intuition is not new. Our model, however, identi…es a set of conditions under which this intuition holds exactly, as in our model a simple borrowing constraint is precisely the di¤erence between the optimal trading mechanisms in the limited-and full-commitment environments.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, related are papers that study, in the context of various applications, equilibrium with threat of default and borrowing constraints (see, e.g., a seminal contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz 1981) .
These papers, take borrowing constraints as given and do not obtain optimality results for borrowing constraints, as we do here.
Second, our results are closely related to those of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , who do provide optimality results for endogenous solvency constraints. The optimal solvency constraints they obtain take the form of limits on portfolios of state-contingent claims.
In contrast, the endogenous borrowing constraint we obtain is literally a constraint on the amount the agent can borrow. Thus, the borrowing constraint that emerges in our model is of the same form as the classic borrowing constraint used in the Bewley-Aiyagari models that are pervasive in macroeconomics and …nance, while the Alvarez-Jermann solvency constraints are not of this simple form. By providing a set of conditions under which the generally complicated Alvarez-Jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint, our paper shows a connection between optimal allocation problems under limited commitment and the exogenously incomplete markets models routinely used macroeconomics and …nance.
Third, our results are related to those obtained in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) .
They show that optimal …rm …nancing policy can be implemented by a combination of debt, equity and a line of credit. Under risk-neutrality, their result follows from the entrepreneur's private information and limited liability, while we our result follows from risk aversion and limited commitment in a full information setting.
Fourth, our analysis of the optimal contracting problem with limited commitment relates our paper to the studies of optimal allocations under commitment frictions, which include Thomas and Worrall (1988) , Kocherlakota (1996) , Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch 19-20) . Our paper make a contribution by extending the analysis to a continuous-time model with persistent shocks, which allows us to provide strong characterization results for optimal allocations, in many cases in closed-form.
In Section 2, we present the environment and a general class of contracting problems we study. In section 3, we characterize the set of solutions to these problems. In Section 4, we provide our general implementation result. In Section 5, we study three special cases of the general model, in which we derive further characterization of the optimal contracts and implementing outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
The contracting problem
Consider the following dynamic contracting problem in continuous time. There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. Let w be a standard Brownian motion w = fw t ; F t ; 0 t < 1g on a probability space ( ; F; P ). The agent's income process y = fy t ; F t ; 0 t < 1g satis…es
where a(y t ) and (y t ) are, respectively, the drift and volatility functions.
2
We assume that the principal and the agent discount at a common rate r. Preferences of the agent are represented by the expected utility function
where c t is the agent's consumption at time t, u(c) : R D ! R is a strictly increasing and concave smooth period utility function and E is the expectations operator. The 2 Implicitly, we assume that functions a and satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 5.2.9 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991) , so the agent's income process y is unambiguously given as the unique strong solution to (1) with an initial condition y 0 . Also, we assume that y t 2 D for all t a.s., where D is the domain of the agent's period utility function u. agent's income process y is publicly observable by both the principal and the agent.
Since the agent is risk averse and the principal is risk neutral, there are gains from trade to be realized between the principal and the agent. The principal o¤ers the agent a contract in which he provides the agent with a consumption allocation c = (c t ; t 0) in return for the agent's income process y. We require that c is progressively measurable with respect to the …ltration fF t ; t 0g. The principal's discounted cost of a contract with an allocation c is given by
The principal can commit to a contract, while the agent cannot. In particular, the agent is always free to walk away from the principal and consume at autarky values
But if he does, he loses all future insurance possibilities.
Let v t denote the conditional expected utility of the agent under allocation c from time t onwards:
The agent will have no incentive to renege on the contract with the principal if the following enforcement constraint
holds at each date t and in every state ! 2 . An allocation that satis…es these enforcement constraints will be called enforceable.
We consider a family of contracting problems indexed by y 0 and V , where
is the total utility value that the principal must deliver to the agent. For each pair (y 0 ; V ) 2 f(y; V ) : y 2 D; V V aut (y)g, the principal's problem is to design an enforceable allocation c that delivers to the agent utility V at a minimum cost C(y 0 ; V ).
That is, the principal's problem at (y 0 ; V ) is
s:t: v t V aut (y t ); for all t and !;
Note that the constraint set in this problem is given by a set of inequalities that are linear in u(c), and the objective function is convex in u(c) because u is concave. Any contract that solves this problem will be called e¢ cient. Let c(y 0 ; V ) denote an e¢ cient contract in the planer's problem at (y 0 ; V ). For each (y 0 ; V ) 2 , the contract consumption allocation c(y; V ) is a process on ( ; F; P ) progressively measurable with respect to the …ltration fF t g. Let = fc(y; V ); (y 0 ; V ) 2 g denote the family of all e¢ cient contracts.
Our task is to characterize the contracts in .
E¢ cient contracts
This section is devoted to characterization of e¢ cient contracts.
Decomposing the continuation utility process
In this subsection, we use a result of Sannikov (2008) to demonstrate how the promised utility process v = (v t ; t 0) de…ned in (2) can be decomposed into the sum of a drift term and a volatility term. This representation of v turns out to be very convenient in a dynamic programming formulation of the planer's problem.
Proposition 1 Let c be an allocation and v the promised utility process as de…ned in (2). There exists a progressively measurable process Y = fY t ; F t ; 0 t < 1g such that
Put di¤erently, the evolution of the promised utility process v implied by c can be decomposed as
This decomposition pins down the process Y uniquely up to a subset of measure zero.
Proof See Sannikov (2008) .
In this representation, r(v t u(c t )) is often referred to as the drift of the promised utility process v t and Y t as the sensitivity of v t to income shocks dw t . Among useful properties of this representation is E t [Y t dw t ] = 0.
Recursive formulation
We need to characterize the contracts in the family . Members of this family are e¢ cient contracts in the planer's problems starting at (y; V ) for each (y; V ) 2 .
The Dynamic Principle of Optimality (DPO) implies that continuation of any e¢ cient contract is itself e¢ cient. This means that continuation contracts of members of are also members of . Indeed, let c(y; V ) 2 be an e¢ cient contract in the problem (y; V ) and suppose that c is applied over some time interval [0; t). At t, the agents's income is y t and his continuation utility is v t . The continuation allocation fc t+s (y; V ); s 0g
of the e¢ cient contract c(y; V ) has to be the same as the e¢ cient allocation starting at (y t ; v t ) for otherwise c(y; V ) would not be e¢ cient to begin with. Thus, for any date t and state ! 2 , 3 we have
where contracts on both sides are processes on ( ; F; P ). In particular, since by Proposition 1 both of these contracts are a.e.-uniquely representable by drift and sensitivity components, (6) implies that the sensitivity components of these representations are the same a.e.:
where Y (y; V ) denotes the sensitivity process of the e¢ cient contract c(y; V ).
In sum, the DPO implies that in order to characterize the contracts in , it is su¢ cient to characterize a pair of real-valued functions (c 0 (y t ; v t ); Y 0 (y t ; v t )), where c 0 :
Because of (6) and (7), these two functions (the so-called policy rules)
can be used in (5) to express the law of motion for the state variable (y t ; v t ) as
This law of motion and the policy rules can be repeatedly applied to generate the sensitivity process Y (y; V ) = fY t (y; V ); t 0g and the contract allocation c(y; V ) = fc t (y; V ); t 0g for any initial (y; V ) 2 .
The HJB equation
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which we derive in this next subsection is a necessary condition that the cost function C(y t ; v t ). 
where subscripts on C denote partial derivatives.
At the boundary v t = V aut (y t ), the HJB is the same except that the controls (c; Y ) must be such that v t+dt V aut (y t+dt ) with probability one. Otherwise, the agent would revert to permanent autarky with positive probability, which would be ine¢ cient.
The HJB equation (8) is a second-order nonlinear partial di¤erential equation (PDE), and as such is hard to work with directly. However, we demonstrate below that it is possible to obtain a unique solution to this PDE by guess-and-verify.
Guess-and-verify
We guess that the optimal consumption at time t is a …xed function of a state variable m t de…ned as follows
where m 0 is determined by the initial condition (y 0 ; V ) 2 . Under our guess, the optimal consumption at time t is given by
where u is a strictly increasing function de…ned below.
Discounted occupation time and the construction of u
Assume that the income process starts at y 0 = y. For any B 2 B(R), let y (B)
be the average discounted occupation time of the Borel set B by the income process y t .
That is,
where 1 B is the indicator function of the set B. For any B 2 B(( 1; y]), let P y (B)
denote the fraction of the average discounted amount of time that the income process spends in a Borel set B ( 1; y] relative to average discounted time that the income process spends below the initial level y, i.e.,
Clearly, P y is a probability measure on (( 1; y]; B(( 1; y])).
We now de…ne u : D ! R by
Thus, u(y) is the expected discounted value of the utility ‡ow that the agents receives under autarky over all time intervals during which his income is below its initial level y 0 = y.
Properties of u
It is obvious that u(y) u(y). The next lemma shows that u is strictly increasing.
In Section 5, we provide closed-form solutions for u in several special cases.
Lemma 1 u is strictly increasing.
Proof In Appendix A
The next two lemmas provide alternative expressions for u, which will be useful. For a income level y and > 0, de…ne y;y+ to the …rst passage time of y + if the income process starts at y. 
Proof In Appendix A Thus for every y, we know that
because the derivative of the right hand side with respect to " is 0.
Cost and value of the allocation c
Let Z(y; m) and V (y; m) be, respectively, the principal's discounted cost and the agent's discounted utility under the contract c given in (9) when the initial state m 0 = m and the initial income y 0 = y.
Lemma 4 V (y; y) = V aut (y).
We can now represent the agent's value V (y; m) as the sum of the utility before and after the …rst passage time y;m follows:
Lemma 5 For any (y; m), y m, the contract in (9) is enforceable.
Proof In Appendix A Clearly, for a …xed y, V (y; m) is strictly increasing in m. We can thus de…ne the function m(y; V ) as the inverse V (y; m) for any …xed y. This function maps the initial utility level V that the principal must deliver to the agent to the initial state m 0 = m(y; V ) such that V (y; m(y; V )) = V . Similarly, the principal's cost of the provision of V is given by J(y; V ) = Z(y; m(y; V )).
Next we show that J = C, i.e., that the contract c constructed in (9) is e¢ cient.
Veri…cation of the HJB equation
It is su¢ cient to show that J(y; V ) satis…es the HJB equation (8).
Proposition 2 J(y; V ) satis…es the HJB equation.
The dynamics of optimal consumption and continuation value
It is clear from (9) that the optimal consumption path is constant whenever y t < m t .
It is a result in the mathematics of Ito di¤usions that y t in fact remains strictly below m t at almost all points in time. Thus, at almost all dates, the optimal contract provides constant consumption. When y t = m t , however, the optimal consumption path increases (permanently).
Unlike the consumption process, the promised utility process v t = V (y t ; m t ) is positively correlated with the income shocks at all times. Intuitively, this is true because a negative income shock (innovation in y t ) lengthens the expected waiting time for the next permanent increase in consumption. Using Ito's lemma, the ratio of the volatility of V to the volatility of y is Y = @V =@y. Since E[e r y;m ] is increasing in y, it can be easily seen from (11) that @V =@y 0. Thus, current continuation utility is positively correlated with current income shocks. As well, it can be easily shown that @V (y; m)=@y @V aut (y)=@y.
Thus, the promised utility process in the optimal contract is less volatile than under autarky, i.e., for a …xed m > y we have
It is also intuitive to guess that @V (y; m)=@y is increasing in y, thus the lower the chance of running into the binding enforcement constraint, the less sensitive the promised utility is to the income shocks. This property can be directly veri…ed in the special cases discussed in Section 5. There, we also provide additional characterization results for the optimal allocation under several particular speci…cations of the utility function and the income process.
Comparison with the discrete-time iid case
The contracting problem we study is related to the discrete-time one-sided commitment model with iid shocks presented in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch19) . In their model, as here, optimal consumption is a …xed, increasing function of the maximal income level realized to date. In their model, the continuation value process is time-monotonic and adjusts only when a new all-time-high income level is realized. In our model, in contrast, the continuation value process is not monotonic in time. This di¤erence comes from the persistence of the income process and the continuity of realized income paths.
In both models, the current continuation value is determined by the current all-time-high realized income level and the chance of a new all-time-high realization occurring in the near future. In the iid case, conditional on the current maximum, for every current income level the chance of hitting a new all-time-high income level in the near future is the same. Under the persistent income process we study, in contrast, this chance does depend on current income level. Current income states more likely to lead to the occurrence of a new all-time-high income level give the agent a higher continuation value, because the prospect of receiving a permanent increase in the consumption level is better at these income states. With continuous sample paths, higher income levels (i.e., those closer to the current all-time-high) are precisely the ones that give the agent a better chance for receiving a new all-time-high income level in the near future. Thus, in our model, the optimal continuation value process is monotonic in current income at all income levels, even those that are strictly below the current all-time high.
It is worth pointing out that our contracting problem is not a trivial extension of the Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch19) problem to the persistent income case. The feature that the current consumption depends only on the historical all-time-high income level could fail in a discrete-time, discrete-shocks model with persistent shocks. In Appendix B, we provide an example in which this is the case. This example demonstrates the importance of the continuous sample paths in our model.
Implementation
In this section, we show that the optimal contract can be implemented in an arrangement in which the principal, instead of o¤ering a long-term contract that swaps the income process y for a consumption process c, o¤ers to the agent a pair of trading accounts: a simple savings account with a credit line, and a hedging account in which the agent hedges his income risk.
We will show that the optimal credit line is non-zero (i.e., the agent gets access to credit). In several cases, we can explicitly compute the optimal size of this (endogenous) borrowing constraint.
Note that the mechanism studied here is signi…cantly less restrictive that the "direct" mechanism in which the planer practically controls the agent's consumption. In the present trading arrangement, the agent has much more control over his consumption than under the direct consumption-for-endowment swap contract c. Yet, we show, the equilibrium consumption process is the same as the optimum c. By dropping the inessential restrictions, the relaxed mechanism gives us a better understanding of the essential restrictions that one-sided limited enforcement imposes on the optimal contracting problem.
The implementation mechanism we consider here is closely related to those of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006) .
The agent' s problem
Recall that C(y; v) is the minimum cost of the principal if the state of the agent's income is y and the agent's continuation utility is v.
Consider the following setup. The principal o¤ers to the agent a bank account with a credit line. Also, the principal stands ready to hedge the agent's income risk at fair odds. We will show that under an appropriate choice of the credit line this mechanism is optimal.
The principal imposes a lower bound B(y) 0 on the agent's bank account balance, or asset level, denoted by A t . The asset A t is risk-free and pays o¤ a net interest r. The agent can default at any point in time.
Conditional on not having defaulted, the agent chooses his current consumption rate c t and his current hedging position t . If the agent's hedging position is t at t, then at time t + dt, the payo¤ to him is t (w t+dt w t ). The price of the hedge is zero. Under these trading conditions, thus, the agent's bank account balance process A t satis…es the following budget constraint dA t = (rA t + y t c t )dt + t dw t ;
A t B(y t ) for all t.
Conditional on not having defaulted, the agent can permanently exit the contract and stay in autarchy forever. In that case, he loses the credit line and the access to hedging the principal, but can consume his own income (y t+s ; s 0) without having to repay his debt A t (if A t < 0) to the principal and without having to deliver on the hedge obligation t dw t (if t dw t < 0). The agent's problem is to maximize E R 1 0 r exp( rt)u(c t )dt subject to the above budget constraints.
Conditional on not exiting, this is a dynamic programming problem with state variables (y t ; A t ) and control variables (c t ; t ). The HJB equation for the agent's value function v(y; A) is as follows rv(y; A) = max c;
Next, we show that the optimal consumption process c t given in (9) and t = C y (y t )+ C v Y t solve the agent's utility maximization problem.
The implementation result
Proposition 3 Suppose the borrowing constraint is given by B(y) = C(y; V aut (y))=r;
and agent's initial assets are
Then, under the above trading mechanism, the optimal consumption allocation c given in (9) and the hedging process t = C y (y t ) + C v Y t are an optimal trading strategy.
Proof In Appendix A Given the terms of trading set by the principal, the agent's chosen trading strategy (which we will refer to as the equilibrium strategy) exactly replicates the optimal consumption process c. A simple conclusion from this proposition is that for e¢ ciency purposes, it is not necessary that the principal controls the agent's consumption. To achieve e¢ ciency, it is su¢ cient for the principal to impose the borrowing constraint (13) and let the agent freely save, borrow and hedge at zero-pro…t pricing. This arrangement is more natural than the long-term contract swapping the agent's income process y directly for the optimal consumption process c. In addition, this trading environment shows that the direct contract imposes restrictions that are not necessary from the e¢ -ciency standpoint. By dropping some of these unnecessary restrictions, the implementing contract allows us to identify more precisely the implications of one-sided commitment for optimal risk-sharing.
In the equilibrium strategy, the agent stabilizes his consumption path at all dates at which his bank account balance A t is strictly above the lower bound B(y t ). He achieves this by a combination of hedging (i.e., choosing t ) and self-insuring (i.e., drawing on or adding to his bank account). The agent's equilibrium hedging position t is non-zero at almost all dates. The measure-zero set of dates at which the agent's hedge is zero consists of exactly those dates at which the bank account balance hits the lower bound B(y t ),
i.e., exactly when the enforcement constraint (4) is biding at the optimal allocation c.
The optimal borrowing limit (13) ‡uctuates with agent's realized income. In Section 5, we provide further results concerning the dynamics of the borrowing constraint and the agent's assets under more fully speci…ed preferences and income processes.
It should also be noted that the agent will never default. Under the trading conditions set up by the principal, the agent is free to re-optimize his strategy at all times. As a solution, the agent obtains a value function that is everywhere greater than the value of autarky. Thus, the agent weakly prefers to not default at all times. 
Thus the consumption is constant at all dates and states.
Comparing the limited-and full-enforcement cases, we see that the borrowing constraint is the only di¤erence between optimal trading environments of the two cases.
Further characterization results in special cases
In this section, we provide further details about the optimal contract and the implementation in three special cases.
CARA utility and Brownian income
Suppose D = R, u(c) = exp( c) and the income process simply satis…es
, V aut (y) = 1 and the enforcement constraints have no bite. It is not hard to
show that under a Brownian motion income process, the expected discounted occupation time P y is exponentially distributed, i.e., for any x y
these joint deviation strategies play a critical role in shaping the optimal institutions (see, e.g., Albanesi and Sleet 2006 ). In our model, they are available but not pro…table to the agent. Thus, they do not play any signi…cant role.
Using this fact, we can compute u from its de…nition (10). As the density function of the occupation time is p 2re
The optimal consumption process, therefore, is given by
where From this closed-form expression, we can check directly that both …rst-order partial derivatives of V are strictly positive. It is also simple to check that the partial derivative @V =@y is strictly increasing in y. Thus, since the optimal sensitivity of continuation value to income shocks Y equals @V =@y, we have that less insurance is provided to the agent as his income increases, and more when his income drops. In the implementing mechanism, therefore is decreasing (in absolute value) in y.
We now examine how C(y; V aut (y)) depends on y. When V = V aut (y), we have m = y and thus we have c t = max 0 s t y s and C(y; V aut (y)) = E r
for all y 2 D. We see that when agent's autarky value equals his continuation value in the contract, at all levels of current income the principal's cost function is constant.
In the implementing mechanism, therefore, the borrowing limit on the bank account is constant
Using E[max 0 s t w s ] = p 2t= , after some algebra, we obtain that
Thus, we can compute
Since 1 p 2r > 1 + log(1 p 2r ), we have that C(0; V aut (0)) < 0, and so the borrowing constraint B(y) < 0.
We can now use C(0; V aut (0)) to compute Z(y; m) for m > y. Under the optimal contract starting at (y; m), the planner's revenue is E r We can now use this expression to …nd the maximal level of initial utility V V aut (y)
that can be delivered to the agent with initial income state y subject to the principal's cost being not more than a number C C(y; V aut (y)) = The Lambert W function W is de…ned as the inverse of the function f (x) = xe x for x 1. 5 Applying the Lambert W function to the above equality, we get
Solving for m and substituting to the expression for V (y; m), we obtain a formula for V (y; C) given as follows
For each y 2 R, V (y; C) describes the so-called contract curve (or the Pareto frontier)
between the principal and the agent. It is easy to check that V (y; C(y; V aut (y)) = V aut (y) is independent of y.
Log utility and exponential Brownian income
Suppose now that D = R ++ , the agent's utility function is logarithmic, u(c) = log(c),
and his income process is an exponential Brownian motion, i.e., it follows d(log(y t )) = dw t :
In this case, V aut (y t ) = w t . Let " be the …rst passage time from w t to w t + , then, as
Thus u(c t ) = log(maxfmax 0 s t y s ; m 0 g)
, and so c t = A m t , where A = e 1= p 2r < 1.
When y = m, consumption is thus given by c t = A max 0 s t y s . The principal's cost for all y 2 D. Thus, when agent's autarky value equals his continuation value in the contract, the principal's cost function is proportional to the current level of income. In the implementing mechanism, thus, the borrowing constraint is proportional to current income. Additional proprieties can be explicitly derived in this case.
Mean-reverting income
Suppose that (log of ) income x t = log(y t ) follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process,
where the constants > 0 and > 0.
The next lemma provides a closed-form expression for the distribution of the average discounted occupation time in the OU case.
Lemma 6 For z x,
Thus, it is enough to show that
is increasing in log(y). This follows from the fact that the Hermite function H is decreasing.
Therefore, as in the other cases considered in this section, the agent is better insured the further away he is from the binding enforcement constraint, i.e., the higher his savings A t are. Further properties in of this case can also be derived.
Conclusion
It has been long recognized in the literature that borrowing constraints are an important tool mitigating the risk of borrower default. Prior to our paper, however, it has not been known whether simple borrowing constraints could actually be an optimal way to mitigate this risk. Our paper provides a set of conditions under which this indeed is the case.
We study a contracting problem with limited commitment in which the state-contingent solvency constraints of Alvarez and Jermann (2000) collapse to a simple borrowing constraint. Constraints of this simple form have been extensively used in macroeconomics and …nance in the context of Bewley-Aiyagari models.
Our continuous-time model is highly tractable. We provide a close characterization of the optimal allocation and the implementation mechanism. In several cases, we provide closed-form solutions.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
The conclusion follows if we show that P y 1 is a tail of P y 2 for any y 1 < y 2 such that y 2 (( 1; y 1 ]) > 0, i.e., that
for any for B 2 B (( 1; y 1 ] ). De…ne = inf t ft > 0 : y t = y 1 g to be the …rst passage time from y 2 to y 1 . Then for B 2 B(( 1;
Proof of Lemma 2
We provide the proof by cases. If (y) = 0 and a(y) 0, then = 1 almost surely.
If (y) = 0 and a(y) > 0, then u(y) = u(y). For 0 < t < , y t 2 [y; y + ], thus 
Proof of Lemma 3
We know that
take limit ! 0, we should get it.
Proof of Lemma 4
From above we know that
For any y < y 1 < y 2 , g(y 1 ) g(y 2 ) is the amount of time between y 1 and y 2 , which is the same as that of the utility between u(y 1 ) and u(y 2 ) in the contract.
Proof of Lemma 5
Note that in the recursive representation of the contract, we have y t m t . So the continuation contract starts with condition (y t ; m t ). Higher m t leads to higher continuation value. So V (y t ; m t ) V (y t ; y t ) = V aut (y t ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the state is (y; m). We …rst show that Note now that the volatility of V is V y (y). We already know that J(y; V ) = r(c( u) y) + @J @y a(y) + @J @V r(V u)
is independent of y, we have that 
Proof of Proposition 3
In the optimal contract, dv t = [rv t ru(c t )]dt + Y t dw t ; dC(y t ; v t ) = [C y a(y) + C v r(v t u(c t )) + 1 2 C yy (y t ) 2 + 1 2 C vv Y 2 t + C yv (y t )Y t ]dt +(C y (y t ) + C v Y t )dw t :
Since C(y; v) satis…es the HJB equation, rC(y t ; v t ) = r(c t y t ) + C y (y t ; v t )a(y t ) + C v (y t ; v t )r(v t u(c t )) + 2 (y t ) 2 C yy (y t ; v t ) + (y t )Y C vy (y t ; v t ) + Y 2 2 C vv (y t ; v t );
we have dC(y t ; v t ) = (rC(y t ; v t ) + y t c t )dt + t dw t :
The above is the agent's budget constraint.
Next we will show that the agent's choices are optimal. To verify this, we will show that these policies satisfy the HJB equation (12).
Since v(y; C) is the inverse function of C(y; v), we obtain
v y = C y C v = C y (y; v(C; y)) C v (y; v(C; y)) ;
These equations imply that the agent's HJB equation (12) is equivalent to the principal's HJB equation (8) . Note that the maximization corresponds to the minimization in the principal's problem.
To conclude, v satis…es the HJB equation (12), thus is the agent's value function in the implementing mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 6
To simplify notation, denote f (x) = x (( 1; z]). Thus f satis…es Note that this example is designed to satisfy the …rst-order stochastic dominance, thus it is easier to reach a high state with a higher initial income level. For small > 0 and 1, we know that u(y 3 ) < u(y 2 ), because starting from state y 3 and before reaching state y 4 , the process stays in y 1 for a long time, while starting from y 2 and before reaching y 3 , the process stays in y 2 for a long time. Thus if income starts at y 2 and transits to y 3 (i.e. y 3 is the all-time-high income), consumption does not update to c 1 ( u(y 3 )).
